Israel and U.S. attacks Iran. What happens next?
By Steve Douglass
If reports that Ali Khamenei and several top commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have been killed in the joint Operation Lion’s Roar strikes, that changes the dynamics dramatically on multiple fronts. In a system like Iran’s, the Supreme Leader isn’t just a figurehead — he’s the linchpin of political, religious, and military authority, the final decision-maker for the Revolutionary Guards, nuclear policy, and internal security. Outside observers — including Benjamin Netanyahu — have said there are “many signs” Khamenei may be gone, and that key military figures have been hit, though Tehran has not confirmed these deaths publicly. (The Guardian)
Inside Tehran, that kind of leadership vacuum would be felt immediately and viscerally. State institutions would be in triage mode: banks and markets might halt operations temporarily as uncertainty spikes, and communications — already strained from bombardment and retaliation — could be disrupted further. Security forces like the IRGC and Basij militia, which ordinarily enforce regime control, would have to decide quickly whether to rally around a successor group or start jockeying for influence. Unlike in a stable democracy where succession is routine, in Iran it is a mix of religious councils, security elites, and clerical authorities that would jostle for control, and that process takes time and creates uncertainty.
If the remaining Guard leadership stays cohesive under a new figure — say a senior general or adviser who was not targeted — the system could reconstitute itself quickly and impose order. You would see heavy military visibility on the streets of Tehran, checkpoints at major intersections, curfews, and rapid suppression of any large civilian gatherings. In that case, the death of top leaders ends up tightening internal discipline rather than dissolving it.
However, if there aren’t clear lines of command, or if rival factions within the Guard and army begin to disagree on how to respond — whether to escalate retaliatory strikes, seek negotiations, or jockey for power — that fracturing would produce instability. Ordinary people in Tehran might find police and militia units acting differently from district to district, with some areas under strict control and others relatively lawless. Fear, rumor, and panic buying — already visible after the first strikes — could intensify as people try to make sense of competing authority messages. (Reuters)
Into this volatile mix come the ongoing military actions. The strikes are not just symbolic; they’ve targeted operational centers, missile sites, and possibly elements of the nuclear program. Iran’s retaliation has already involved missiles and drones directed at Israel and U.S. bases across the region, prompting sirens, interceptions, and heightened readiness in multiple countries. (The Times of India) In practical terms that means Tehran isn’t automatically slipping into political calm — it’s being battered from multiple directions, and that compounds internal stress.
If the U.S. were to send in stealth bombers tonight to specifically go after Iran’s remaining nuclear infrastructure — the deeply buried enrichment facilities at places like Natanz or Fordow — that would introduce a new layer of complexity. Such strikes are logistically challenging and inherently risky: Iran’s most sensitive nuclear infrastructure is protected deep underground and guarded by air defenses that have already been active. Even with stealth capabilities, the risk of collateral damage to civilian structures increases, which could fuel anti-American sentiment and feed Iranian propaganda that the conflict is an existential struggle against foreign invaders.
Destroying nuclear sites would also likely eliminate any plausible diplomatic path — remaining Iranian technocrats or moderates who might have favored negotiation would lose leverage. From inside Tehran’s fractured power circles, hardliners could use such strikes to justify even harsher crackdowns and rally support around revenge. That, in turn, would heighten the risk of asymmetric retaliation: cyberattacks, missile attacks on U.S. forces, and importantly, terrorism overseas. Past conflicts have shown that when a regime feels cornered or eliminated, its proxy networks — whether in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, or even sleeper networks abroad — become more active. Intelligence professionals would almost certainly raise terrorism threat levels across Western countries, particularly around symbolic or high-profile targets. (Reddit)
Global markets would feel these reverberations too, especially energy markets. Iran’s geography near the Strait of Hormuz means any perception of instability can send oil prices sharply upward and disrupt shipping patterns, insurance costs, and broader economic confidence. Past strikes on nuclear facilities have already caused volatility in oil and equities as traders weigh risk against supply fears. (https://www.wgem.com)
This is all to say that if Khamenei and multiple senior commanders are genuinely gone, the situation in Tehran would not settle into a single outcome quickly. On one hand, a new leadership core might assert control and keep the regime intact, imposing order from above. On the other, internal power struggles could turn the city into a patchwork of contested authority until one faction prevails. Layer in the ongoing external military pressure — including possible future strikes on nuclear sites — and the risk of regional escalation and global economic shocks increases.
From Israel’s perspective, eliminating the core of Iran’s decision-making structure would be viewed as a historic operational success. Tehran has been Israel’s most capable long-term adversary, especially in terms of missile development, proxy warfare, and nuclear ambition. Removing the Supreme Leader and senior IRGC leadership would significantly disrupt centralized command and could degrade Iran’s ability to coordinate complex retaliation in the short term.
But here’s the paradox: tactical success can produce strategic escalation.
In the immediate term — the next 72 hours — Israel would likely be on its highest nationwide alert level in decades. Missile defenses such as Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow would be operating continuously. Airspace restrictions would remain tight. Reserve mobilizations could expand. Critical infrastructure protection would intensify. The expectation in Israeli security planning would be that retaliation is not only possible, but probable.
If Iran’s remaining leadership stays cohesive, Israel should expect heavy, symbolic retaliation. Ballistic missile salvos aimed at major cities, attempts to overwhelm missile defense systems, and attacks on strategic targets like power plants or military bases are plausible. Even if interception rates are high, volume alone creates risk. Civilian casualties inside Israel would dramatically shift the domestic political atmosphere.
If Iran’s leadership fractures instead, the situation becomes more unpredictable rather than safer. Some missile units or proxy networks could act autonomously. That increases the risk of miscalculation or uncontrolled escalation. Israel’s northern border becomes especially sensitive because of the role of Hezbollah. Hezbollah possesses a massive rocket arsenal and is deeply integrated into Iran’s strategic architecture. If it enters the fight in force, Israel would face a multi-front war that stretches missile defense capacity and ground forces.
There’s also the nuclear dimension. If American stealth bombers were to conduct deep strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities — particularly hardened enrichment sites — Israel would likely support that action strategically. It would remove, or at least delay, the long-term existential threat Israel has consistently cited.
However, striking nuclear infrastructure carries consequences. It could push any successor regime in Tehran toward accelerated weaponization under a “never again” survival doctrine. It also risks environmental contamination if facilities are damaged in ways that release hazardous material. And politically, it eliminates moderate voices within Iran who might have argued for negotiation rather than confrontation.
For Israel, that means the nuclear issue could temporarily recede militarily but intensify politically unless they are entirely destroyed.
On the terrorism front, Israel would absolutely expect reprisals. Iranian-aligned networks have global reach. Israeli embassies, Jewish community centers abroad, and soft targets would go on heightened alert worldwide. Cyberattacks against Israeli infrastructure would likely surge. Maritime threats in the Red Sea or Mediterranean could increase. Israeli intelligence agencies would shift heavily toward disruption and pre-emption mode.
Domestically inside Israel, the political impact would depend on outcomes. If strikes are seen as eliminating a historic threat with limited Israeli casualties, the government would likely experience a surge of public backing. If retaliation causes heavy damage or drags Israel into prolonged multi-front conflict, internal criticism would rise quickly. Israeli society is resilient under threat, but prolonged war strains economic activity, reserve forces, and public morale.
Economically, Israel’s markets would likely experience sharp volatility. Defense spending would increase. Tourism would collapse temporarily. Tech and export sectors could face disruption if airspace closures and regional instability persist. However, Israel’s economy has historically rebounded quickly after conflicts, provided they remain limited in duration.
The biggest strategic question for Israel is this: does decapitating Iran’s top leadership reduce long-term threat, or does it radicalize the successor regime?
If the post-Khamenei leadership consolidates under even harder-line IRGC figures, Israel could face a more openly militarized and revenge-driven adversary. If internal fragmentation weakens Iran’s ability to project power, Israel gains strategic breathing room — but at the cost of regional instability and potential proxy chaos.
If the leadership of Iran has been removed — including Ali Khamenei — Western governments would almost certainly prefer to see someone in charge who is more inclined toward engagement with the West, diplomacy, and economic reform, rather than hardline anti‑West ideologues. That doesn’t mean Western governments would be trying to “install” someone directly — that has a long history of backfiring — but the type of leadership they’d hope for would be markedly different from the clerical‑military fusion that has controlled Iran since 1979.
In practice, the group that Western policymakers have traditionally looked to as a potential bridge are moderates or pragmatists, like former Iranian reformists who have advocated negotiations, economic opening, and better relations with Europe and the U.S. People like President Masoud Pezeshkian (prior to recent crackdowns) embodied this approach, pushing for economic improvement and diplomatic engagement as a way out of stagnation. These figures generally aren’t ideologically aligned with the hardliners in Tehran’s security establishment, and they focus more on economic and social issues than regional militancy.
Opinion research before the latest wave of conflict — including surveys of tens of thousands of Iranians — showed that a large majority of the population wants fundamental change, with many opposing governance based on religious law and desiring the end of the Islamic Republic structure. A large percentage also favored democracy over military or religious rule. That suggests that, at least in broad ideological terms, ordinary Iranians would be open to systems very different from the current one.
But the reality inside Iran is far more complicated. The Iranian opposition isn’t unified. Exiled figures like Reza Pahlavi, son of the last Shah, have symbolic recognition and some Western political support, but many inside Iran reject the idea of returning to monarchy — partly because of the history of repression under the Shah and partly because they fear trading one authoritarian model for another. Other opposition groups like the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK) have detailed transition plans and some international backing, yet are broadly unpopular internally because many Iranians see them as having a problematic history or being disconnected from domestic society.
On the ground, reformists have been repeatedly suppressed by the regime, and in recent months many leading reform figures have been arrested, eroding their organizational capacity and credibility in the eyes of many citizens. Even among Iranians who want change, there is deep skepticism about political elites inside and outside the country — including those seen as aligning too closely with Western governments.
So would Iranians “welcome” a Western‑supported government? The short answer is mixed. Many Iranians want change from the current system, but there isn’t a single, widely accepted domestic figure or faction that stands as a clear alternative, nor is there unified support for a Western‑backed transition.
Large portions of the population suffer economic hardship, face corruption, and resent heavy‑handed repression, which fuels support for change — but they also deeply distrust external interference because of historical events like the 1953 U.S./U.K.‑backed coup that overthrew a democratically elected government.
Whether Iran’s citizens are ready to “join a modern world and economy free of sanctions” if given that chance depends on how you define that phrase. Many ordinary Iranians, especially younger generations and urban professionals, aspire to more personal freedoms, better economic opportunity, integration with global markets, and an end to punitive sanctions. But sanctions have also crippled the middle class and targeted precisely the groups who might serve as bridges to reform, weakening those voices domestically.
So the picture inside Iran is something like this: a population largely dissatisfied with the current regime and open to alternatives; a reformist camp that has been weakened and discredited by repression; a fractured opposition in exile without broad domestic legitimacy; and deep historical memory of foreign intervention that makes the idea of a Western‑backed government unpopular to many, even those who want change.
If the regime collapsed, Iranians wouldn’t all chant the same slogans about what comes next — some would push for democracy with sovereignty and national pride, others might favor strong nationalist voices, and some would reject any external influence outright.
That’s one reason why Western hopes for a “friendly” successor regime have historically backfired in many countries: outsiders often underestimate the complexity of internal dynamics, the diversity of domestic aspirations, and the deep mistrust of foreign interference. In Iran, where legitimacy is tied not only to politics but to history, religion, and identity, any transition would be negotiated as much inside society as it would be on the geopolitical stage.
Nothing about this is static. The scenario we’re looking at is extremely fluid: battlefield reports, leadership confirmations, and diplomatic shifts are changing by the hour. In hours and days to come, the trajectory could range from temporary consolidation under a new hardline leadership to a far more chaotic power struggle within Iran that alters the Middle East’s security landscape for years.
