Tuesday, July 12, 2022

New Bell Invictus photos leak online

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Bell’s 360 Invictus advanced helicopter is now 90 percent complete and has had its new open tail rotor system attached at the company’s facility in Amarillo, Texas. Originally designed with a canted, ducted tail rotor, Invictus’ entire tail boom structure was reconfigured to simplify the design and speed building Bell’s pitch for the U.S. Army’s Future Attack Recon Aircraft.

New photos of the Invictus (sans engine) began showing up on Twitter and other social media platforms, most likely taken outside the Bell Amarillo Assembly plant.

"One of the things we looked at is as we were doing a competitive prototype, and at the same time are iterating on a weapon system of what the [engineering and manufacturing development] aircraft is going to be — the increment one aircraft — and the way we’re organized is to maintain the connective tissue between those two so that we can keep them as close as possible in terms of what we’re doing on the CP and what the weapon system will be,” Flail recently told reporters on a media trip to Texas." 

As per U.S. Army speed requirements, the tandem-cockpit, single-main-rotor Bell 360 Invictus is designed to fly at least 180 knots. The aircraft’s main rotor system is based on Bell’s 525 Relentless helicopter — which has flown at speeds beyond 200 knots in test flights — but will be scaled to fit the Invictus. While the Bell 525 has five rotor blades, the 360 Invictus will have four.

Bell is competing against Sikorsky and its Raider X helicopter in the FARA contest. The Raider X is a compound-coaxial helicopter with counter-spinning main rotors and a pusher propeller.

Monday, July 11, 2022

Lockheed Martin reveals it's testing lasers on tactical aircraft


WASHINGTON: Lockheed Martin today revealed that it delivered a compact directed energy weapon to the Air Force Research Lab in February, a key milestone in the service’s effort to equip a tactical fighter jet with a laser capable of shooting down anti-aircraft missiles.

“It is the smallest, lightest, high energy laser of its power class that Lockheed Martin has built to date,” Tyler Griffin, a company executive, told reporters earlier this month in the run up to the Farnborough Air Show. “It is a critical benchmark in developing an operational laser weapon system in the airborne domain.”

While the Pentagon has pushed forward a number of different directed energy weapons in recent years, the value of this one, dubbed LANCE, is its minimal space, weight and power requirements. “It’s one-sixth the size of what we produced for the Army going back to just 2017,” Griffin added, referring to the Robust Electric laser Initiative program.

The LANCE acronym stands for “Laser Advancements for Next-generation Compact Environments.” Lockheed got the initial contract to design, develop and produce LANCE in November 2017 as part of the Air Force’s Self-protect High Energy Laser Demonstrator (SHiELD) program.

That effort has three components: in addition to LANCE, there is a beam control system, built by Northrop Grumman, which directs the laser on its target, as well as a pod that is mounted on the aircraft. Boeing is responsible for that pod subsystem, which the Air Force said it received in February 2021.





Friday, July 8, 2022

China hints B-2- lookalike stealth bomber may be flying soon

By
Ashish Dangwal Eurasia Times 


July 8, 2022

A top Chinese official recently announced plans to perform a test flight for an ‘essential aircraft’ with critical strategic and historical significance, fueling speculation that the long-rumored H-20 strategic stealth bomber could make its maiden flight soon.

Ge Heping, the Party chief of the Chinese Flight Test Establishment, a division of the state-owned Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), made the statement during a rally meeting on Tuesday.


The statement was issued to mobilize personnel involved in the test, State-run Global Times reported, citing the press release. Ge urged everyone involved in the aircraft’s development to realize how crucial it is to complete this mission fully.

The Chinese Flight Test Establishment, also known as the AVIC Flight Test Center, was established in 1959. China’s only national body authorized to carry out validations and flight tests for aviation products, such as military and commercial aircraft, aero engines, and airborne equipment.

However, the aircraft’s designation and type were not made public in either the report or the press release.

The widely expected H-20 strategic stealth bomber was a common assumption among internet users. Some claimed that only H-20 is befitting the description of having strategic and historical significance.

The Chinese military has occasionally offered a few updates on H-20. In January 2021, a scene from the service’s recruitment video featured the flying wing design of the next-generation, long-range strategic stealth bomber being developed for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force.

Thursday, July 7, 2022

Gallagher amendment would protect UAP/UFO military /government contractors whistleblowers from losing security clearances


AMENDMENT TO RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 117–54OFFERED BY MR. GALLAGHER OF WISCONSINAt the end of subtitle E of title XVI, add the following new section: 1 SEC. 16ll. UNIDENTIFIED AERIAL PHENOMENA REPORT ING PROCEDURES. 

3 (a) AUTHORIZATION FOR REPORTING.—Notwith4 standing the terms of any written or oral nondisclosure 5 agreement, order, or other instrumentality or means, that 6 could be interpreted as a legal constraint on reporting by 7 a witness of an unidentified aerial phenomena, reporting 8 in accordance with the system established under sub9 section (b) is hereby authorized and shall be deemed to 10 comply with any regulation or order issued under the authority of Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; 12 relating to classified national security information) or 13 chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 14 2271 et seq.). 

15 (b) SYSTEM FOR REPORTING.— 16 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The head of the Office, 17 on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the DirecVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:01 Jul 01, 2022 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 

C:\USERS\AJSCIASCIA\APPDATA\ROAMING\SOFTQUAD\XMETAL\11.0\GEN\C\GALLWI_1 July 1, 2022 (10:01 a.m.) G:\M\17\GALLWI\GALLWI_166.XML g:\VHLD\070122\D070122.024.xml (846812|2) 2 1 tor of National Intelligence, shall establish a secure system for receiving reports of— 3 

(A) any event relating to unidentified aerial phenomena; and 5 (B) any Government or Government con6 tractor activity or program related to unidentified aerial phenomena. 8 (2) PROTECTION OF SYSTEMS, PROGRAMS, AND 9 ACTIVITY.—The system established pursuant to 10 paragraph (1) shall serve as a mechanism to prevent 11 unauthorized public reporting or compromise of 12 properly classified military and intelligence systems, 13 programs, and related activity, including all categories and levels of special access and compartmented access programs, current, historical, and future. 17 (3) ADMINISTRATION.—The system established 18 pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be administered by 19 designated and widely known, easily accessible, and 20 appropriately cleared Department of Defense and intelligence community employees or contractors assigned to the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task 23 Force or the Office. 24 (4) SHARING OF INFORMATION.—

The system 25 established under paragraph (1) shall provide for the VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:01 Jul 01, 2022 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 

C:\USERS\AJSCIASCIA\APPDATA\ROAMING\SOFTQUAD\XMETAL\11.0\GEN\C\GALLWI_1 July 1, 2022 (10:01 a.m.) G:\M\17\GALLWI\GALLWI_166.XML g:\VHLD\070122\D070122.024.xml (846812|2) 3 1 immediate sharing with Office personnel and sup2 porting analysts and scientists of information pre3 viscously prohibited from reporting under any non4 disclosure written or oral agreement, order, or other 5 instrumentality or means, except in cases where the 6 cleared Government personnel administering such 7 system conclude that the preponderance of information available regarding the reporting indicates that 9 the observed object and associated events and activi10 ties likely relate to a special access program or compartmented access program that, as of the date of 12 the reporting, has been explicitly and clearly re13 ported to the congressional defense committees and 14 congressional intelligence committees, and is documented as meeting those criteria. 16 (5) INITIAL REPORT AND PUBLICATION.—Not 17 later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 18 of this Act, the head of the Office, on behalf of the 19 Secretary and the Director, shall— 20 (A) submit to the congressional intelligence 21 committees, the congressional defense commit22 tees, and congressional leadership a report de23 tailing the system established under paragraph 24 (1); and VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:01 Jul 01, 2022 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 

C:\USERS\AJSCIASCIA\APPDATA\ROAMING\SOFTQUAD\XMETAL\11.0\GEN\C\GALLWI_1 July 1, 2022 (10:01 a.m.) G:\M\17\GALLWI\GALLWI_166.XML g:\VHLD\070122\D070122.024.xml (846812|2) 4 1 (B) make available to the public on a 2 website of the Department of Defense informa3 tion about such system, including clear public 4 guidance for accessing and using such system 5 and providing feedback about the expected 6 timeline to process a report. 7 (6) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Section 1683 of the 8 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 9 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373) is amended— 10 (A) in subsection (h)— 11 (i) in paragraph (1), by inserting 12 ‘‘and congressional leadership’’ after ‘‘ap13 propriate congressional committees’’; and 14 (ii) in paragraph (2), by adding at the 15 end the following new subparagraph: 16 ‘‘(Q) A summary of the reports received 17 using the system established under title XVI of 18 the National Defense Authorization Act for Fis19 cal Year 2023.’’; and 20 (B) in subsection (l)— 21 (i) by re-designating paragraphs (2) 22 through (5) as paragraphs (3) through (6), 23 respectively; and 24 (ii) by inserting after paragraph (1) 25 the following new paragraph (2): VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:01 Jul 01, 2022 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 

C:\USERS\AJSCIASCIA\APPDATA\ROAMING\SOFTQUAD\XMETAL\11.0\GEN\C\GALLWI_1 July 1, 2022 (10:01 a.m.) G:\M\17\GALLWI\GALLWI_166.XML g:\VHLD\070122\D070122.024.xml (846812|2) 5 1 ‘‘(2) The term ‘congressional leadership’ 2 means— 3 ‘‘(A) the majority leader of the Senate; 4 ‘‘(B) the minority leader of the Senate; 5 ‘‘(C) the Speaker of the House of Rep6 representatives; and 7 ‘‘(D) the minority leader of the House of 8 Representatives.’’. 9 (c) RECORDS OF NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS.— 

10 (1) IDENTIFICATION OF NONDISCLOSURE 11 AGREEMENTS.—The Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of 13 Homeland Security, the heads of such other departments and agencies of the Federal Government that 15 have supported investigations of the types of events 16 covered by subparagraph (A) of subsection (b)(1) 17 and activities and programs described subparagraph 18 (B) of such subsection, and contractors of the Federal Government supporting such activities and pro20 grams shall conduct comprehensive searches of all 21 records relating to nondisclosure orders or agreements or other obligations relating to the types of 23 events described in subsection (a) and provide copies 24 of all Relevant documents to the Office. VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:01 Jul 01, 2022 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 

C:\USERS\AJSCIASCIA\APPDATA\ROAMING\SOFTQUAD\XMETAL\11.0\GEN\C\GALLWI_1 July 1, 2022 (10:01 a.m.) G:\M\17\GALLWI\GALLWI_166.XML g:\VHLD\070122\D070122.024.xml (846812|2) 6 1 (2) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—The head of the Office shall— 3 (A) make the records compiled under paragraph (1) accessible to the congressional intelligence committees, the congressional defense 6 committees, and congressional leadership; and 7 (B) not later than September 30, 2023, 8 and at least once each fiscal year thereafter 9 through fiscal year 2026, provide to such committees and congressional leadership briefings 11 and reports on such records. 

12 (d) PROTECTION FROM LIABILITY AND PRIVATE 13 RIGHT OF ACTION.— 14 (1) PROTECTION FROM LIABILITY.—It shall not 15 be a violation of section 798 of title 18, United 16 States Code, or any other provision of law, and no 17 cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any 18 court or other tribunal against any person, for re19 porting any information through, and in compliance 20 with, the system established pursuant to subsection 21 (b)(1). 22 (2) PROHIBITION ON REPRISALS.—An employee 23 of a Federal agency and an employee of a contractor 24 for the Federal Government who has authority to 25 take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:01 Jul 01, 2022 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 

C:\USERS\AJSCIASCIA\APPDATA\ROAMING\SOFTQUAD\XMETAL\11.0\GEN\C\GALLWI_1 July 1, 2022 (10:01 a.m.) G:\M\17\GALLWI\GALLWI_166.XML g:\VHLD\070122\D070122.024.xml (846812|2) 7 1 any personnel action, shall not, with respect to such 2 authority, take or fail to take, or threaten to take 3 or fail to take, a personnel action, including the revocation or suspension of security clearances, with respect to any individual as a reprisal for any reporting as described in paragraph (1). 7 

(3) PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION.—In a case in 8 which an employee described in paragraph (2) takes 9 a personnel action against an individual in violation 10 of such paragraph, the individual may bring a private civil action for all appropriate remedies, including injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive 13 damages, against the Government or other employer 14 who took the personnel action, in the United States 15 Court of Federal Claims. 16 (e) REVIEW BY INSPECTORS GENERAL.—Not later 17 than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, 18 the Inspector General of the Department of Defense and 19 the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall 20 each— 21 

(1) conduct an assessment of the compliance 22 with the requirements of this section and the operation and efficacy of the system established under 24 subsection (b); and VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:01 Jul 01, 2022 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 C:\USERS\AJSCIASCIA\APPDATA\ROAMING\SOFTQUAD\XMETAL\11.0\GEN\C\GALLWI_1 July 1, 2022 (10:01 a.m.) G:\M\17\GALLWI\GALLWI_166.XML g:\VHLD\070122\D070122.024.xml (846812|2) 8 1 (2) submit to the congressional intelligence 2 committees, the congressional defense committees, 3 and congressional leadership a report on their respective findings with respect to the assessments 5 they conducted under paragraph (1). 6 (f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 7 (1) The term ‘‘congressional intelligence committees’’ has the meaning given such term in section 9 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 10 3003). 11 (2) The term ‘‘congressional leadership’’ 12 means— 13 (A) the majority leader of the Senate; 14 (B) the minority leader of the Senate; 15 (C) the Speaker of the House of Rep16 representatives; and 17 (D) the minority leader of the House of 18 Representatives. 19 (3) The term ‘‘intelligence community’’ has the 20 meaning given such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). 22 (4) The term ‘‘Office’’ means the office established under section 1683(a) of the National Defense 24 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 25 3373(a)). VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:01 Jul 01, 2022 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 

C:\USERS\AJSCIASCIA\APPDATA\ROAMING\SOFTQUAD\XMETAL\11.0\GEN\C\GALLWI_1 July 1, 2022 (10:01 a.m.) G:\M\17\GALLWI\GALLWI_166.XML g:\VHLD\070122\D070122.024.xml (846812|2) 9 1 (5) The term ‘‘personnel action’’ has the meaning given such term in section 1104(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234(a)). 4 (6) The term ‘‘unidentified aerial phenomena’’ 5 has the meaning given such term in section 1683(l) 6 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 7 Year 2022\

 (50 U.S.C. 3373(l)). ◊ VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:01 Jul 01, 2022 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6301 C:\USERS\AJSCIASCIA\APPDATA\ROAMING\SOFTQUAD\XMETAL\11.0\GEN\C\GALLWI_1 July 1, 2022 (10:01 a.m.) G:\M\17\GALLWI\GALLWI_166.XML g:\VHLD\070122\D070122.024.xml (846812|2)


LINK TO DOC

Thursday, June 30, 2022

Russian troops give up snake Island

THE GUARDIAN


Ukrainian forces have pushed Russian forces from Snake Island, a strategic Black Sea island off the southern coast near the city of Odesa.

Russia portrayed the pullout from Snake Island off the port city of Odesa as a “goodwill gesture”. Ukraine’s military said the Russians fled the island in two speedboats after a barrage of Ukrainian artillery and missile strikes.


Ukraine’s win will weaken any plans Russia may have for a future land attack on that stretch of coastline, Ukrainian officials say.

Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, the commander of Ukraine’s armed forces, said Ukrainian-made Bohdana howitzers had played an important role in routing Russian forces from Snake Island, and he thanked foreign partners for their support.

“KABOOM!” Tweeted Andriy Yermak, the head of the Ukrainian presidential administration. “No more Russian troops on Snake Island.”

Russia’s ministry of defence stated that it had completed its assigned tasks and was tactically withdrawing to allow for grain exports from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports.“In order to organise humanitarian grain corridors as part of the implementation of joint agreements reached with the participation of the UN, the Russian Federation decided to leave its positions on Zmiinyi Island,” the defence ministry said.

Yermak described Russia’s claim of goodwill as a lie.

Ukrainian forces also reported a small win in the country’s southern Kherson region, which has been occupied by Russian forces since the beginning of the invasion. Ukrainian forces now control the Kherson village of Potomkine, according to Ukraine’s military.

But Russia continues to carry out attacks in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region, having secured almost all of Luhansk region this month, to fulfil its goal of securing the entire Donbas region. Six people were injured in an attack on the city of Slovyansk, according to its mayor, Vadym Lyakh.

Ukraine said it had forced Russian troops to flee overnight on two speed boats. The statement, by Ukraine’s southern command, said explosions could still be heard and the island was covered in smoke, appearing to indicate a battles may be continuing.

Snake Island was made famous when Russia first captured it in February. A Ukrainian soldier posted on the island told an attacking Russian warship to “go fuck yourself”, which has become one of the most popular Ukrainian slogans of resistance since the invasion.

The Ukrainian postal service issued a stamp showing a Ukrainian soldier giving the finger to the Russian cruiser Moskva.

The blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports by Russia has caused grain prices to soar, threatening famine in several countries.

Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, Kyrylo Budanov, said in May that the island was critically important to both Russia and Ukraine. He said whoever controlled Snake Island controlled the land – and to some extent air – security of southern Ukraine. He said at the time that Ukraine believed Russia could use the island to launch an invasion of western Ukraine and send troops into Moldova’s Transnistria region, where Moscow already has troops stationed.

An adviser to Ukraine’s interior ministry, Vadym Denysenko, told Ukrainian TV that Snake Island’s recapture was a “huge victory” for Ukraine.

He said that after Ukraine destroyed Russia’s Mosvka warship, the Russians wanted to turn Snake Island into a anti-aircraft defense hub. He said they planned to then use the island to control the entire western part of the Black Sea and launch a land invasion, he said.

“Now the Russians cannot do anything in this area of the sea, except, unfortunately, shell Ukrainian cities with missiles from their ships,” Denysenko said.

Ukraine’s armed forces have reported carrying out several attacks on the island since it was captured. On 2 May the army released a video of strikes carried on two Russian patrol boats near Snake Island.

Attacks increased on the island in the last two weeks. A spokesperson for Ukrainian’s southern command said on Monday that there was “ongoing operation” to liberate the island but it was likely to go on for a long time. The southern command also released a video showing 10 strikes on the island, one of which allegedly shows the destruction of a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defence system.


The previous week, on 17 June, Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian tugboat that they said was carrying ammunition, weapons and personnel to the island. On 20 June Ukraine targeted gas platforms near Snake Island that Russia had reportedly been using. The explosion was so loud that people in Vylkove, the nearest Ukrainian land settlement, could hear it, according to residents interviewed by the Economist.

On 22 June Ukraine published a satellite image of the island. It said black dots represented places where it had successfully attacked Russian positions.

Russia appears to have responded by firing missiles into the Odesa region. Ukraine said six people were injured in the attack, including a child.


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